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Introduction
One of the most sensitive areas in the current negotiations between
the European Community and Spain, Greece and Portugal, is the whole area
of agricultural policy.

There are many reasons why agriculture has always

been one of the stumbling blocks impeding further expansion and integration

of the community.

Most countries have extensive internal agricultural-support

programs for both economic and political objectives such as national-security,
income-redistribution or foreign-exchange objectives.

Thus, governments

are reluctan~ if not unwillin& to relinquish control over agricultural policy
and/or lessen the protection offered to agriculture, even if that entails
significant costs for consumers or other sectors in the economy.

Thus, one

of the most difficult tasks of the European Conununity upon its creation in
1958 was to develop a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that would promote the
interests of the Community as a whole but would also respect the national
objectives of the individual members and protect as much as possible the
already existing structures.

It is this basic contradiction in the

fundamental objectives of CAP that has characterized its history and is
responsible for its increasingly complicated regulations.
It is also this contradiction that makes its implementation difficult
any time that there are structural changes in the system such as the move
in 1971 towards flexible exchange rates or the 1973 expansion of the EC
to include Britain, Denmark and Ireland.

Further enlargement of the

community to include Spain, Portugal and Greece will thus be an additional
test for CAP which will need to be revised and adjusted in order to reconcile
the often conflicting interests of the member countries.
This paper attempts {a) to analyse some of the implications of the
three countries' entry_ for the exercise of the Common Agricultural Policy
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within the augmented community and {b) to provide a framework within which
to study the distribution of costs and benefits between the partners once
entry is completed.

As this paper is supposed to serve as a guide for further

study, the arguments and information presented are often sketchy.

There

is great need for a more systematic analysis of future developments in the
relevant commodity markets and for a careful evaluation of alternative policies
that could be pursued to meet the CAP objectives.
Section 1 of the paper presents a schematic overview of existing CAP
regulations regarding commodities which are of basic interest to the applicant
countries.

These include such typical Mediterranean exports as olive oil,

tobacco, fruits and vegetables and wine.

Section 2 of the paper analyses

some of the implications of multilateral tariff reductions and the introduc
tion of a price support system for Mediterranean exports for inter-European
trade and more specifically for the agricultural terms of trade and trade
balances between the applicant countries and the Community of nine.

This

is done with the help of a simple and highly aggregate log-linear model of
demand and supply which can easily be disaggregated by either commodities
and/or countries.
The final section of the paper focuses on the nature of costs which

will be potentially borne by the Community of nine due to entry and some
of the possible adjustments that they might seek to enforce.
Section 1
Agriculture is still a highly significant sector in all three of the
Mediterranean countries involved.

Even though, as can be seen in Table 1,

the share of agriculture in total Gross Domestic Product has sharply declined
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Table 1

Agriculture as%
Countries

of GDP
(Constant prices 1970)

Employment in
.A.griculture
as a percentage of
Total Labour Force

Per Capita GDP
in Agriculture
as Percentage of
the EEC Average

1960

1975

1960

1975

1960

Spain

19.5

9.8

42.3

22.0

31

44

Greece

21.9

14.7

57.0

35.4

26

43

Portugal

25.7

12.3

42.8

28.1

31

27

17.0

8.7

100

100

Eur 9
France

9.6

5.6

Italy

11.6

8.2

Ireland

19.8

18.3

Source:

Commision of the European Communities, Economic and Sectoral
Aspects: Commission analyses supplementing its views on
enlargement, COM(78) 200 final.

1975
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between 1960 and 1975 in all three countries, it is still significantly
higher than in most other European countries with the exception of Ireland.
The importance of agriculture is even more pronounced with regard to genera
tion of employment opportunities.

In 1975, employment in agriculture was

22 percent of the total labour force in Spain, 35.4 percent in Greece and
28.1 percent in Portugal as opposed to an average 8.7 percent in the rest
of the European Community.

The large number of workers employed in the

rural sectors relative to existing capital or land and the small size of
the average farm,has resulted in significantly lower productivity of land
and labour in the Mediterranean countries than in the rest of Europe.

These

tendencies coupled with increasing emphasis placed by governments on rapid
industrialization, have resulted in low per capita incomes in the rural
sectors of those countries.

As can be seen in Table 1, per capita GDP in

agriculture in all three countries in 1975 was less than half the correspond
ing figure for the rest of the Community.
agriculture as a fraction of the

In Portugal per capita GDP in

EC average has even declined between 1960

and 1975 from 31 percent to 27 percent.

According to Commission projections1

therefore, full membership of Spain, Greece and Portugal into the EC will
imply that at least in the short-run (a) the total number of people engaged
in agriculture in the EC will more than double, (b) agricultural production

will not increase concomitantly due to low labour productivity and (c) regional
disparities within the extended community will increase.
The agricultural sector in all three countries is significant in terms
of foreign exchange earnings.

In 1975, agricultural exports 2 ,in value terms,

accounted for 20.5 percent of totat exports in Spain, 15.3 percent of total
exports in Portugal and 30.4 percent of total exports in Greece. 3 As can
be seen

in Table 2,at least in 1975, the EC absorbed more than half of the
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Table 3

EEC Prices as a Percentage of
World Market Prices

1973-74

1975-76

Wheat

80

125

Rice

60

137

Maize

98

128

Sugar

66

109

Beef and Veal

111

158

Pig Meat

131

113

Butter

320

320

Milk Powder

156

266

Commodity

Source:

SRI International, Business Intelligence Program, Agricultural
Policy of the EEC, June 1977, No. 1016.
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total agricultural exports of Spain and Greece and 41.7 percent of the total
agricultural exports of Portugal.

This high share of trade with EC countries

is largely the result of a sequence of trading agreements between the Mediter
ranean countries (notably Greece), and the EC ever since 1962.
usually involved specific commodities.

These have

The high prices of EC agricultural

goods in contrast to world market prices is probably the best explanation
why agricultural imports from the EC into the Mediterranean countries have
remained limited.

As can be seen in Table 3, by 1975-7~most of the important

agricultural commodities could be obtained more cheaply from the rest of
the world.

The implications of entry into the EC for domestic inflationary

pressures due to the redirection of trade of the Mediterranean countries
from cheaper to more expensive sources of supply, will be dealt analytically
below.

At this stage, however, it is important to note that whereas imports

from the EC have been limited, exports of agriculture goods to it have already
been extensive.

Thus,from a static viewpoint, full membership would imply

fewer gains for the exporting countries than would have been the case had
Mediterranean products been excluded from the European Markets through a
stringent application of the Common Agricultural Policy.
The composition of trade is roughly

similar for all three countries.

As can be seen in Table 4, Spanish agricultural exports consist mainly of
fruit and vegetables, citrus fruit in particular, wine and olive oil.

Apart

from cork, Portugal exports mainly wine, preserved fish, preserved fruit and
vegetables.

Finally Greece exports fresh and processed fruit and vegetables,

tobacco, wine, raisins and olive oil.

Over 20 percent of agricultural

imports in all three countries is accounted for by maize while sugar imports
are almost equally significant.

Since trade between the EC and the Mediter-

ranean countries tends to be relatively concentrated in

few goods, a closer

Table 2
External Trade ir1 Agricultural Products* of Spain, Greece and Portugal

Total agricultural
expor ts to all
destinations
US $ million

Total agricultural
imports from all
countries
US $ million

Value of agricultural exports
to EEC
US $ million

1970

1975

1970

1975

1970

1975

Spain

697.7

1,~81.2

553.4

2,045.1

423.4

1,015.3

60.7

Greece

259.6

693.9

191.5

479 .. 5

143.0

. 366. 5

Portugal

177.1

300.4

180.1

765 .. 6

73.1

125. 3

.

Agricultural
exports to EEC as
% of total agricultural exports

Value of agricultural imports
from EEC
US$ million

Agricultural
imports from
EEC as% of
total agricultural imports
1970
1975

1970

1975

64.2

102.8

301.0

18.6

14.7

55.1

52.8

52.8

137 .9

27.6

28.6

41.6

41.7

29.2

91.5

16.2

12.0

1970

1975

*(Total of O + 1 in SITC classification)
Source:

Commission of the European Communities, Economic and Sectoral Aspects; Commission Analyses Supplementing its Views
on Enlargement, COM(78) 200 final, April 27, 1978.

....,
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Table 4

Main Agricultura l Products Imported and
Exported by the Three Countries
Exports
l E:xports
(% of Country's Total Agricultura
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Commodity
Fresh and
Processed
Fruits and
Ve~etables
Wine
Olive Oil
Fish Preparations
Raw

Tobacco

Source:

I

1975
Imports
(% of Country's Total Agricultura l Imports)
Commodity

Spain

Greece

Portugal

57

58

17

Live Animals
and Meat

5

15

5

12

3

40

Milk Products

4

11

1

5

6

2

Maize

22

26

21

-

-

15

Sugar

15

12

23

21

-

Vegetable
Proteins

23

8

12

Commission of the European Communities , Economic and Sectoral
Aspects; Commission Analyses Supplementi ng its Views on
Enlargement , COM(78) 200 final, April 27, 1978.
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look at existing CAP regulations pertaining to those coD111odities can be

helpful in highlighting some of the issues involved in the negotiations.
The C~mmon Agricultural Policy has evolved around three basic
principles:
Financing.

(a) Common Pricing, (b) CoD111unity Preference and (c) Common
Common Pricing implies the Conununity-wide regulation of prices,

not necessarily however
between the areas.

at a single level, so as to promote free trade

Target prices and intervention prices are usually set

for each commodity; these are allowed to differ between major producing and
consuming areas to take account of transportation costs and thus promote
exports.

The actual level of targeted prices is usually the result of extensive

bargaining between those countries which have a :omparative advantage in
the production of

a

commodity and can thus produce it at low costs, and

those which prefer to protect domestic, relatively inefficient, production
by maintaining high prices. 4 An important aspect of Common Pricing is that
there can be no restrictions placed on production.
Conununity Preference refers to those set of policies such as the
import levy system, minimum import prices, the use of quotas, compensatory
taxes and subsidies,which ensure that intra- EC traded products will always
be cheaper than the corresponding imports.
Finally,Common Financing implies that the EC will always be willing
to bear the costs associated with agricultural policy.
Regulations for each of the commodities are slightly different.
Regarding those goods which are the major agricultural exports of the three

applicant countries,

Italy and Southern France are the major competing

producers.

The first regulations pertaining to fruits and vegetables appeared
in 1962 but major provisions have been added since.

Domestic production is
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protected from outside competition by high import duties (20 percent or
more ad valorem) and reinforced by "reference prices" which are in fact
minimum import prices.

In the case where the domestic price of an import

competing good is even lower than the reference price, a "compensatory tax"
is automatically imposed by the EC on the imported commodity involved.
In the past there has been preferential treatment granted to most Mediter
ranean countries through the use of preferential rates with the provision,
however, that export prices will be kept above reference prices.

Full

membership in the EC will thus imply an effective reduction of EC tariffs
against fruit and vegetable exports from the three applicant countries.

It will also probably imply a net increase in the price of those goods
receivedhydom estic producers and thus a concomitant expansion in supply.
Entry into the EC would also imply the effective reduction of tariffs vis
a-vis Mediterranean exports of wine.

Even though preferential treatment

has already been extended in the past to these countries, protection was
guaranteed through the common external tariff, quality-contro l certificates
and compensatory taxes.

Even though there will be increased competition

within the Community on account of entry, prices will in all probability
be kept high.

This might result in increased production and creation of

further surpluses especially in lower-quality wines.
A similar development can be expected for olive oii where, apart

from a market target price which has traditionally been fixed at a level
above world market prices, producers have benefited from direct transfers

to supplement their income.

Protection from outside competition has been
I

granted in tpis case with the aid of market intervention and variable
import levies.

These still apply to the three applicant countries even
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though preferential reductions in the levy have been granted.
The only one of the relevant commodities for which import duties
have already been eliminated is tobaccq where entry will mainly affect
Greek production and exports.

The major competing producers within the

European CoIIDllunity are Italy and France, which, in 1972,contributed 59
percent and 33 percent of total EC production respectively.

Price

support is guaranteed by a different producer target price for each of the
twenty or so different types of tobacco produced, with the intervention
price still considerably higher than the price of competing imports.

Com

munity preference is established by domestic subsidies rather than a
variable levy against imports and complemented by premiums paid to buyers
of domestic tobacco leaves which have often ranged between 60 and 80 percent
of the intervention price for most types.

Thus, extension of the subsidy

schemes to cover Greek tobacco production will probably increase the price
of Greek tobacco and result in some expansion of production.
All of the above conclusions, however, crucially depend on the out
come of negotiations.

This will be determined not only by the interactio~

of the two negotiating sides but also by·the nature of the objectives of
the applicant countries' themselves.

As will become clear in Section 2,

the strategy of an applicant country can be different if the government
attempts to improve the terms of trade for redistributive policies than if
it wants to maximize export receipts.
The preceding analysis also points to the fact that unless corresponding
policies are adopted on the part of the augmented EC, expansion will entail
some trade creation due to the elimination of tariffs but also increased

production and surpluses of key commodities unless market prices are allowed
to fall.

Higher food prices for the incoming countries and losses due to
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trade diversion will also be some of the harmful side-effect s of entry.
These issues as well as the distributiv e issues within the augmented Ee"

are taken up in Section 3.
Section 2
In Section 1, we briefly outlined some of the existin2 rP.211l~t1nns nf

CAP regarding commodities for which the Mediterrane an countries enjoy a
comparative advantage and traced some of the implication s of entry for the
future marketing of those commodities .

It was concluded that for most

agricultura l goods entry implies a multilatera l reduction in tariffs and/or
other trade impediments as well as a possible increase in the net price
received by producers due to the extensive support system.

This exogenous

increase in the net price received by producers might also be applicable
for some EC exports if, on account of higher transportat ion costs, an upward
adjustment of targeted prices takes place.
The implication s of entry for terms-of-tr ade and balance-of- trade
development s within the region, can be better understood within the frame

work of a simple supply-and-d emand model.

The model, initially developed

for the analysis of exchange rate policy in developing countries, 5 can be
applied here as well for the analysis of bilateral trade relations or for
the analysis of trade flows between the Mediterrane an countries and the
Community of Nine.
Export Price Movements
On the export side, net export supply prices are stated in home

currency units, pn, while demand price~ which include the ad volarem tariff,
X
are stated in foreign exchange unit~, qg.
X

The exchange rate, e, links
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p8 to q8 while the tariff level, tf, links gross to net demand prices.
X

X

The export supply function is written as,

(1)

0

Here p

X

is a vertical shift parameter representing changes in domestic supply

conditions, s
exported.

is the price elasticity of supply, and Xis the quantity

X

The foreign demand funtion for home exports denominated in foreign

exchange units, is
g

O

~

X

tna- • tnq

+ dX-1 tnX

(2)

0
where, qX is a vertical shift parameter. which can represent changes in world

market conditions.

Thus, an increase in agricultural support prices might
0

be represented by an increase in qX •

The price elasticity of demand in (2)

is represented by dX and Xis again the quantity exported.
To convert demand into home currency units we can use the relationship,

Px • eq X or 1npX • tne + tnq X

(3)

The demand function expressed in home currency units is thus equal to,

(4)
To translate finally consumer prices into producer prices we use the
relationship
(5)
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where

p 8 is the gross price for home goods which the foreigner pays,
X

pn is the price which the local producer receives and tf is the tariff
X

Substituting (5) into (4) and solving for p n ,

imposed by the foreigner.

X

the demand function can be expressed as,
tnp

n
X

• inq

o
X

+ d

-1

f
inX + ine Min (1 + t)

n

(6)

Equations (1) and (6) can now be combined to solve for market
equilibrium p

X

and x.

The total differentials of (1) and (6) are,

.n
-1 •
·o
PX - sX X • PX

and

·t

t

.

The solutions for p:

.n
rx

n

and X are given by

d

X
IC---d - s
X

•
s d
X .. X X
d - s
X

(6')

e -

..f
,._

\I

X

sX

d

X

- s

X

•o , and
PX

(7)

(8)
X

Equation (7) can be rewritten as,

(9)

where k is defined as

1
• - - - - • 0 < k < 1.
s· '

1 -

X

dx
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In (9), pn is expressed as a weighted average of external and internal dis
x

turbances with the weights given by k.

The effect of any disturban ce on pn

·X

will crucially depend on the magnitude of k, i.e. the ratio of the relevant
elasticit ies of demand and supply.
markets so that d

X

~

If the country is a price taker in export

- •, k approache s unity.

Hence k can be used as a

proxy for relative market power; k however, is also affected by the magnitude

of the supply elasticit y of exports.

In eigher case, k can fluctuate between

zero and unity.

Import Price Movements
The import supply and demand functions are exactly analogous to the
export functions with the only exception that import supply is now given
in terms of foreign exchange prices ~nd import demand is given in terms of
domestic currency.

Thus supply for imports in foreign exchange can be expressed

as,

1nq

n
m

• tnq

o
m

+ s -1 tnM
m

(10}

and in home currency units,

n
1np • !nQ o + s -1 tnM + tne
m
-m
m

(11}

Import demand, in home-curr ency and consumer -price terms is:
(12}
Again the differenc e between the price consumers pay and the price

producers rec~ive is accounted for by domestic tariffs so that the demand
function expressed in terms of net prices is,,

lei

(13)

Takin g total diffe renti als of (10) and (13) and solvi ng
for the equil i
n
brium ~l'm and. 8 we obtai n:
s
.n
m
( ·o + e)
pm - s
qm
d
m
m

M

. s m -dmd
s

m

m

{Co+
qm
·n
m

Equat ion (14) for p

-

d

•o
td
(pm
1+
td
dm
m
m

s

e + -td-

1 + td

·o }
td) - Pm

•d
t );

.

(14)

(15)

can be again expre ssed as a weigh ted avera ge

of exter nal and intern al distur bance s with the weigh ts
k' and 1 - k'
being funct ions of the relati ve elast icitie s of demand
and suppl y for
impo rts.

Thus (14) can be rewri tten as,

(16)

where

k' -

sm
sm

1

- dm= 1 - dm
s

0

<

k' < 1.

m

Again here, k' can be used as an index of marke t power
on the impor t side,
so that if the count ry is a price -take r in impor t marke
ts so thats ~ ~,
m
k' would appro ach unity . Here again the price elast icity
of demand for
impor ts critic ally affec ts the magn itude of k'.

Terms of Trade Movements
The terms of trade of a count ry is given by the ratio of
expor t to
impor t price s.

Where tariff s are invol ved, the terms of trade can be
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expressed in terms of either gross or net prices.

Here we choose to express

them in net-price terms; the solution in terms of gross prices is easy to
obtain.

Since, 1rn

it follows that

(17)

or

.n

11'

-

•n

p

X

•n
m

- p •

(18)

Substituting equations (7) and (14) for

p: and p: in (18)

we obtain

the following:

.n
'I

-

{(k - k')e}

+

{(1 - k') - -

+ {

td

•d

l + td

l

t - k -- f

1 + t

"f
t }.

(19)

Equation (19) expresses the percentage change in the terms of trade
as a function of exchange rate changes (e), external price (qi; i • x, m) and
internal price (pi; i • x, m) disturbances,an d finally changes in the level
of domestic and foreign tariffs.

The impact of any exogenous disturbance

on the equilibrium terms of trade crucially depends on the magnitude of
market power on the export or import sides or on net relative market power in
the case of exchange rate changes.
Leaving aside exchange rate changes as well as domestic price
disturbances and
or (

focusing instead on tariffs and potential increases in

due to the price support system in CAP, we conclude the following:

4°X
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1.

If the country or group of countries in question are price takP.r~ i" hotn

markets so that k • k' • 1, then, neither changes in domestic tariff
schedules not shifts in external prices
of trade.

q0X

and

0
qm
will

affect the terms

These will be affected only by changes in foreign tariffs on

domestic exports.
2.

The terms-of-trade are worsened with a unilateral reduction in domestic

tariffs or an exogenous increase in the foreign price of imports.

The effect

on the terms of trade depends on import-side market power as well as the
initial level of domestic tariffs.
3.

The terms-of-trade improve with unilateral reductions in foreign tariffs

or an exogenous increase in the foreign price of exports.

Again here the

effect on n depends on the degree of export-side market power and the existing
level of foreign tariffs.
Finally,

4.

The implications of multilateral reductions in tariffs or changes in foreign

prices for the terms of trade are ambiguous and depend not only on the existing
tariff levels but also on the relative market power of the economy on the
export or import sides.

Balance-of-Trade Implications
The balance of trade in agricultural commodities between two partners
can be expressed as
BT • p~ - p~.
X
m

If we set p

X

s

p

m

= 1 initially, differentiation of (20) yields

(20)
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where X and M are initial values.
0

If one assumes that both the exchange

0

rate and domestic supply conditions remain unchanged so that

e•

p0x

•

p0

m

X,

O, substitution for pn,
x

•

pn,
n

Mfor

equations (7), (8), (14) and (15)

yields,
X

dBT • 0
+ k (1 + s)
x Xo qx

o

-

•f

t

td
•d
+ (1 - k' (1 + d ) ) _;;__..,.. M t
m 1 + td o

k'(l + d)
.o
m Moqm

(21)

From equation 21 the following conclusions can be derived:
1.

A unilateral reduction in foreign tariffs or an increase in foreign prices

for local exports unambiguously improve the balance of trade.
2.

The effects of a unilateral reduction of domestic tariffs on the balance of

trade is ambiguous depending on the sign of the expression 1 - k'(l + dm).
3.

From (1) and (2) above, it follows that multilateral reductions in

tariffs have ambiguous ·effects on the balance of trade depending on the
magnitudes of the relevant elasticities, and the pre-level tariff and trade
flows.

The same holds true for autonomous increases in the foreign price of

exports and imports.
If most Mediterranean countries are assumed to be price takers on
the import side but face a less than infinitely elastic demand for their
exports at least for prices ab~ve the intervention prices, then, there will
probably be some net improvement in the terms of trade both on account of
tariff reductions and the application of the price support system.

Only

if the rise in the foreign price of agricultural imports is sufficiently
high to outweigh the other effects will the terms of trade deteriorate.

lO

The effects on the net foreign exchange receipts is harder to ascertain
even if simplifying assumptions are made regarding the degree of market
power.

Even though on tariff reduction grounds one would expect a deteriora

tion of the balance of trade the enforcement of the price support system

might raise foreign prices of exports sufficiently as to increase net foreign
exchange receipts.

Section 3
Apart from changes in the terms of trade and balance of trade between
the two sets of countries, entry will also create efficiency gains or losses
for the community as a whole.

The appropriation of these gains by a set

of countries or particular economic agents within the EC, will have redis
tributive effects which are worth examining.
Trade creation refers to potential improvement in resource utilization
by inclusion within the Community of more efficient producers.

ri following

entry, prices of Mediterranean goods and their substitutes are allowed to
adjust downward to reflect the lower costs of production in the entering
countries, then there will be net gains to the Community as a whole:

the

most efficient producers will expand their market share, while the gains
to the consumers will exceed the total loss of both the government which
would lose tariff revenue and domestic producers who
of the market.

would be driven out

If prices, however, are not allowed to fall, then there

will be no benefits to the Community as a whole due to trade creation.
The incoming countries in that case will expand their production and ap
propriate all the gains from enlargement.

EC consumers and producers will

still face the same set of prices while imports from the rest of the world
would be cut due to trade redirection towards the new partners.

Thus, if
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Greece, Spain and Portugal become full member~ but prices of Mediterranean
goods continue to be supported to the same extent as before, one would
expect countries such as Turkey and Israel to be the major losers while the
incomin~

countries would appropriate all the gains.

If the EC on the one hand does not want a redaction in the price of
such goods as fruits and vegetables, olive oil, wine, etc. in order to protect
French and Italian interests, and on the other hand, fears the creation of
additional surpluses in those goods, then one would expect it to put pressure
on the incoming countries to bear some of the costs of adjustment.

This could be

done by some form of agreement on diversification in agricultural production,
limitation of total acreage, voluntary export restraints or even direct quotas
on Mediterranean exports.
Turning now to trade in other agricultural goods, one should expect
a worsening of resource utilization on account of enlargement.

Once they

are full members, the applicant countries are expected to eliminate their
tariffs vis-a-vis EC exports and adopt the Community Preference policies.
This would entail significant trade redirection away from third countries
which, as can be seen in Table 3, happen to be the most efficient producers
of basic agricultural goods, towards the more inefficient EC countries.
This trade redirection will imply higher prices for domestic consumers and
a net·. loss for the entering countries.
The trade-diversion costs will probably be even higher since en
largement might bring about a rise in minimum import prices for the
community as a whole.

This will probably be the case since Community

Preference legislation specifies that the level of "threshold prices" (or
ainimum import prices) should be fixed for the most distant point in the EC
so as to assure preference for EC commodities there as well.

Thus, for
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sugar for example, threshhold prices are fixed with regard to prices prevail
ing in Palermo, Sicily so that transportation costs from the main producing
areas to Palermo do not negate Community Preference.

6

Thus. enlargement would probably bring about a rise in threshold prices
at least proportional to marginal transportation costs to Greece and
Portugal.

This in fact will increase the rate of protection offered to EC

producers and reduce the degree of competition.
From the above, it follows that unless some of CAP regulations are
relaxed or altered, expansion of the European Community will entail a direct
transfer from consumers to producers with greater

benefits accruing to the

producers in the entering countries than those in the Community of Nine.
Even though this transfer will be probably welcome by the entering countries,
it will create additional domestic inflationary pressures and will magnify
the already significant problems facing CAP.
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